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Recent theories of fairness (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt,
1999) have typically used the assumption of ex ante known pie size. Here I
explore theoretically the ramiﬁcations of pie size being unknown ex ante. Us-
ing a simple allocation problem known as dictator game, I ﬁnd that attitude
to fairness is systematically and intuitively related to risk and risk attitude.
Results from informal experiments support the model proposed here.
Abstrakt: Souˇ casn´ e teorie spravedlnosti (napˇ r. Bolton, Ockenfels, 2000, a
Fehr, Schmidt, 1999) typicky vyuˇ z´ ıvaj´ ı pˇ redpokladu pˇ redem zn´ am´ e velikosti
celkov´ eho kol´ aˇ ce. V tomto ˇ cl´ anku teoreticky zkoum´ am d˚ usledky pˇ r´ ıpadu,
kdy velikost kol´ aˇ ce pˇ redem nen´ ı zn´ ama. Na jednoduch´ e pˇ rerozdˇ elovac´ ı ´ uloze
zn´ am´ e jako dikt´ atorsk´ a hra ukazuji, ˇ ze postoj ke spravedlnosti je system-
aticky a intuitivnˇ e sv´ az´ an s rizikem a postojem k nˇ emu. Navrˇ zen´ y model
podporuj´ ı i v´ ysledky prvn´ ıch neform´ aln´ ıch experiment˚ u.
Keywords: inequity aversion, dictator game, risk, expected utility, con-
stant relative risk-aversion
JEL classiﬁcation: D63, D64, D811 Introduction
Important recent papers (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999)
have tried to explain the results of pie distribution experiments which suggest
that many subjects do not behave in the purely selﬁsh manner postulated
by standard economic theory1. Both models incorporate other-regarding
behavior in the form of inequity aversion as their key explanatory component.
They are also constructed under the assumption of ex ante known pie sizes.
The world, however, is not always fully known ex ante.
Take the situation of a couple who want to be together for the rest of
their lives. While deeply in love, she is rational enough to know that there
is a - ever so slightly - chance that things will not work out as planned.
She is the better prospect commercially (being as it is, a hot-shot lawyer,
fresh out of a top-notch law school) while he is a sensitive guy who writes
wonderful poems but is unlikely to eke out more than a meager living from
his profession. Hence, she wants a prenuptial agreement. He has no choice
but to accept in its entirety whatever it is that she wants.
Clearly, this is a one-shot dictator game. It is also a dictator game under
uncertainty or risk (dependent on whether we assume the range of possible
outcomes to be known or not) because the dictator does not know what the
size of the pie will be if, contrary to today’s blissful expectations of living
happily ever after, push would come to shove. What will the dictator do in
1For example, the game-theoretic prediction in dictator and ultimatum games suggests
zero giving using standard selﬁsh preferences. Experimental studies, however, provide
clear evidence on positive giving for both games; the transfer to the recipient amounts to
about 20% of the pie size for the dictator game and more than twice that for the ultimatum
game.
1such a situation? In this paper, based on results from informal experiments2,
I assume that she has a preference for relative rather than for ”absolute”
giving, and I investigate how the variance of possible pie sizes, i.e. the risk
associated with the distribution, will aﬀect her oﬀers. I also explore how this
decision is related to her risk attitude.
2 ERC3 analysis of the game
Both the Fehr-Schmidt model and the Bolton-Ockenfels ERC model study
interactions of n people. In both models, people care about their own payoﬀs.
The diﬀerence lies in the modelling of inequity aversion. In Fehr & Schmidt
(1999), it is expressed as some linear function of the diﬀerence of one’s own
payoﬀ and the various payoﬀs of other actors, while in the ERC model it is
expressed as some function of the relative payoﬀ, i.e. the ratio of one’s own
payoﬀ to the sum of all payoﬀs4.
For two-person games the distribution of payoﬀs is fully, and conveniently,
determined by either the absolute or the relative payoﬀ of a single agent.
Consequently, with any sum of total payoﬀs, the Fehr-Schmidt utility can be
viewed as a special case of the ERC motivation function (the diﬀerence in
absolute payoﬀs is equal to the diﬀerence in relative payoﬀs times a constant
2And also based on the key behavioral assumption of most models of reciprocity and
fairness.
3ERC = Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
4For example, if the payoﬀs are 6, 3 and 1 for the other players and 5 for oneself, then
inequity aversion according to Fehr & Schmidt is measured as 6-5=1 on one side and (5-
3)+(5-1)=6 on the other side; for the ﬁnal inequity aversion both of these values (weighted
by possibly diﬀerent fairness sensitivity parameters) are used. For the ERC model, the
diﬀerence of the relative payoﬀ to the equal division matters, i. e. 5
15 − 1
4, where the
second number normalizes the relative payoﬀ with respect to the equal standing.
2representing the size of the pie to be distributed5). Hence, the following
ERC analysis of the game can be easily translated into the corresponding
Fehr-Schmidt analysis.
Let the motivation function be additively separable:
v(y,σ) = u(y) − kf(σ)
where y is the absolute payoﬀ of the player we are interested in (the dictator)
and σ is her relative payoﬀ (i.e. the ratio of her absolute payoﬀ to the sum of
all payoﬀs). To fulﬁll the assumptions of ERC theory, let u be a continuous
increasing concave function (i.e. the marginal utility of one’s own payoﬀ is
decreasing), f be a continuous strictly convex function attaining its minimum
at σ = 0.5 (the disutility which a player experiences from her relative position
in the game is minimized when her payoﬀ equals that of the other player), and
k > 0 be a constant (the coeﬃcient k quantiﬁes how much she cares about
her relative payoﬀ). As k → 0, she cares less and less about her relative
standing and becomes, in the limit, a selﬁsh actor with utility function u
postulated by standard economic theory.
Let C be a random variable which determines the size of the pie to be
distributed. Let p be the proportion of the pie that the dictator is willing to
5Take for example payoﬀs 5 and 3. For the Fehr-Schmidt model, inequity aversion is




is the total size of the pie in the game.
3transfer to the recipient. Then, the dictator’s maximization problem is6:
max
p Ev((1 − p)C,1 − p) = max
p [Eu((1 − p)C) − kf(1 − p)].
Note that for the utility maximizing decision holds p ∈ [0,0.5] since the
allocation p = 0.5 is always preferred to any allocation p0 > 0.5. Note
also that the level of inequity aversion is the same for all realizations of
the random variable C since the dictator’s decision determines the relative
payoﬀs no matter what the actual size of the pie will be.
Since under our assumptions above (concavity of both components of
the motivation function, and hence of the motivation function itself), the
second-order condition is automatically fulﬁlled, the optimal dictator giving




0(1 − p) = 0.
To be able to compute comparative static results, and for the sake of
computational convenience, I assume that u is a function of the constant
relative risk aversion variety, namely u(x) = sgn(r)xr with r ≤ 1, r 6= 07.
(Recall that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is equal to r − 1 for such
functions). I can then rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition as
(1 − p)
1−rf





6I assume for now that agents are expected utility maximizers. I am aware that this
assumption is a topic of ongoing disputes on which I remain agnostic. My interest here is,
within the framework of previous studies, to analyze the ramiﬁcations of decision making
under risk. I am in the process of extending my analysis to prospect theory.
7See for example experimental results by Holt & Laury, 2002.
4Note that if the right hand side does not belong to the interval (0,f0(1))
then border dictator giving occurs - either none or half of the pie will be
transferred.
For any distribution (here, of pie sizes), the value of E(Cr) represents a
risk associated with a given distribution. For example, in the case of EC1 =
EC2 it is easy to see that V arC1 < V arC2 ⇐⇒ E(C2
1) < E(C2
2) since
V arCi = E(C2
i )−(ECi)2. Similarly, for symmetric distributions it is always
true (and in fact it is typically true for arbitrary distributions) that if EC1 =
EC2 and V arC1 < V arC2 then also E(Cr
1) < E(Cr
2) for all r < 0 and
E(Cr
1) > E(Cr
2) for all r ∈ (0,1). This is due to the convexity/concavity
of function xr. Thus, the right-hand side of equality (1) is increasing or
decreasing with the increasing ”risk” of a given distribution depending on the
relative risk-aversion of the economic agent, i.e., whether r < 0 or r ∈ (0,1),
respectively. Note that for r = 1 (i.e., risk-neutral players) the decision p
depends only on the expected size of the pie.
An analogous analysis for the constant relative risk-aversion function cor-
responding to r = 0, i.e. for u(x) = logx, yields the following ﬁrst-order
condition:
kf




Note that the dictator’s decision under this functional speciﬁcation does not
depend on the size of the pie distributed in the dictator game.
It is possible to reﬁne the above analysis further if we also assume f to
be of the constant relative risk-aversion variety (although this term is not
5about risk aversion but reﬂects rather inequity aversion), i.e.
f(σ) = (σ − 0.5)
γ
where γ > 1 to assure its strict convexity. Consequently, f0(1−p) =
γ(1−2p)γ−1
2γ−1










2γ−1 is a constant.
Under the given parameter assumptions (r < 1, γ > 1), it is easy to show
that the left-hand side of (2) is a decreasing function of p. This means that
dictator giving is lower when the right-hand side is higher and vice-versa.
Together with my analysis of the eﬀects of risk attitude on the right-hand
side of (1) above, I prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Within the ERC framework, people characterized by a coef-
ﬁcient of relative risk aversion below -1 will decrease their dictator giving for
any given pie size as risk increases, and people with a coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion above -1 will increase their dictator giving in such a situation.
Decisions of people with relative risk aversion equal to -1, as well as decisions
of risk-neutral agents, will be unaﬀected by risk when pie size is unknown ex
ante.
What is the intuition behind this theoretical result? As the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion decreases from 1, people are willing to be more altruistic
up to a certain level; they substitute risk aversion for fairness. However, after
6that level, risk aversion prevails and people start to treat risk and fairness
attributes as complements, decreasing the giving with higher risk. When the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is equal to -1, the behavior crosses the
neutral point as it was in the starting coeﬃcient of 1.
Remark 1: A similar comparative statics analysis can be done with respect
to changes in the size of the pie if it is not uncertain. In that case, all expected
value operators will disappear and, as a result, the ERC model suggests
higher (lower) dictator giving for larger sizes of the pie for coeﬃcients of
relative risk aversion below (above) -1, and no inﬂuence of the pie size in
the case of logarithmic utility. Similarly, risk-neutral people would decrease
their oﬀers with increasing pie.
Remark 2: A similar analysis can also be done for a generalized model of
the Fehr-Schmidt type where the argument in function f is now the diﬀerence
of the payoﬀs of the players, i.e. (1 − 2p)C. The situation is then somewhat
more complicated since E(Cγ) also enters into the denominator of the right-
hand side in (1) and hence plays a role in the behavior of dictator giving in
such a model. But then, since the term E(Cγ) in the denominator decreases
the right-hand side in equations (1) and (2) when the risk increases, the only
diﬀerence in the new speciﬁcation of the model is that the critical value of
parameter r (i.e. the value when the dependence of behavior on risk switching
is similar to that in the proposition above) is lower than 0 (or, equivalently,
the critical coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is lower than −1); it decreases
even more with increasing parameter γ and such a change may also diﬀer for
diﬀerent types of probability distributions.
7Remark 3: The analysis is applicable also to risk-loving agents, i.e. those
with convex selﬁsh utility u. However, the second-order condition can then
be invalid and in such a case, the dictator giving p ∈ [0, 1
2] will not be the
interior point. Typically, in such a situation the model predicts zero dictator
giving in riskier conditions for these kinds of agents.
In fact, such a result conforms to the intuition that very high payoﬀs are
really attractive for risk-loving agents and, thus, these agents do not like to
share such payoﬀs with others, at least compared to lower payoﬀs which are
more likely to happen.
3 Discussion
I chose to analyze the dictator game because giving behavior in this game
depends only on a single person’s preferences. I thus could study preferences
in their purest form. The results of the informal experiments I conducted in
Prague and Jena demonstrate, quite intuitively, that risk aversion matters
and hence ought to be incorporated into models explaining other-regarding
behavior. The pilot experiments suggest that people prefer relative over ab-
solute oﬀers under risky conditions. This fact conforms to the intuition that,
if there is a choice, risk-averse agents prefer to share risk over bearing it
themselves. The pilot experiments also suggest that on average, again quite
in line with intuition, decision makers want to keep a certain risk premium,
and that subjects decrease their giving (both absolute and relative) with in-
creasing risk, suggesting that for the average subject the coeﬃcient of relative
8risk aversion is less than −18. Of course, people are heterogeneous so the
actual giving behavior is diﬀerent for some people. That said, for almost all
subjects both risk and fairness attitudes factor into their giving behavior.
My model above formalizes this result.
The present research can be expanded in various ways. First, the ex-
pected utility approach can be replaced by an approach based on prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Such an extension allows for modeling
divergent perceptions of gains and losses and results in diﬀerent predictions
for diﬀerent types of people, which also conforms to diﬀerent behavioral pat-
terns observed in various experiments.
Second, an extension of my analysis to more complicated games such as
the ultimatum game seems desirable even though the experimental results
for such a setting are going to be noisier due to beliefs playing a role in the
decision making. Also desirable seems experimental work that tries to assess
empirically the correlation between risk and fairness attitudes.
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